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NOTE
ITEM 303'S ROLE IN PRIVATE CAUSES OF ACTION
UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
Bian Neach*
INTRODUCrION
Stated simply, a "fonvard-looking statement" in the context of se-
curities law represents a statement "describ[ing] events or activities
that will occur, if at all, at some future date."' Although the federal
securities statutes contain a specific definition of "fonward-looking
statement,"2 the term refers generally to a company's predictions, pro-
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School 2001; BA University of
California at Santa Barbara. I would like to thank Professor Matthew Barrett of the
Notre Dame Law School for providing me with the opportunity to turn this little
research project into a Note. I would also like to thank Professor Hov.ard Friedman
of the University of Toledo Law School for his input and suggestions during the
writing of this Note. Finally, I need to thank my wife, Shannon, and my two
daughters, Veronica and Lauren, for their support, encouragement, and laughter
during much-needed writing breaks.
1 JANtms D. Cox Er At., SEcUmREs REGU.ATION: C.As AsD NtwEXnAIs 71 (2d ed.
1997).
2 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(i) (A)-(D) (Supp. IV 1998); see also id. § 78u-5(i) (1) (A)-(D).
According to these statutes, the term "forward-looking statement" includes the
following:
(A) a statement containing a projection of revenues, income,... earnings
[per share], capital expenditures, dividends, capital structure, or other
financial items;
(B) a statement of the plans and objectives of management for future op-
erations, including plans or objectives relating to the products or ser-
vices of the issuer;,
(C) a statement of future economic performance, including any such state-
ment contained in a discussion and anal)sis of financial condition by
the management or in the results of operations included pursuant to
the rules and regulations of the Commission;
(D) any statement of the assumptions underlying or relating to any state-
ment described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C); ....
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jections, forecasts, and opinions regarding its sales, earnings, losses,
and any other aspect of its business.3 Because these statements are
"inherently uncertain,"4 companies making such statements in the ab-
sence of any statutory protection could potentially find themselves lia-
ble for inaccurate predictions.
Recognizing a need for a balance between the investment com-
munity's desire for access to a company's forecasts and the potential
for liability stemming from such statements, Congress enacted "safe-
harbor" provisions for forward-looking statements in the Private Se-
curities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.5 These safe-harbor provisions
have produced two important effects: (1) reporting companies0 have
enjoyed a reduced threat of liability related to forward-looking state-
ments, thus increasing the quantity of disclosure of such information;
7
Id. §§ 77z-2(i) (A)-(D), 78u-5(i) (A)-(D). As discussed infra, the SEC further classifies
forward-looking statements into two categories: (1) statements regarding future ef-
fects of currently known data that-given other requirements are met-must be dis-
closed; and (2) statements based upon anticipated future events that are only
optional disclosures. See 17 C.F.R § 229.303(a) instr. 7 (2000); infra notes 58-60 and
accompanying text. Throughout this Note the term "forward-looking" refers gener-
ally to either of the two categories of statements. In discussions where the distinction
matters, the first category will be referred to as "required" or "mandatory" disclosures,
and the second category will be referred to as "optional" disclosures. Additionally,
because this Note focuses on disclosures made in a company's SEC filings, unless
otherwise indicated the term "forward-looking statement" refers only to statements
made in such filings.
3 See Suzanne J. Romajas, Note, The Duty to Disclose Forward-Looking Information: A
Look at the Future of MD&A, 61 FoRDHAm L. REV. S245, S245 n.5 (1993) (citing HousE
COMM. ON INTERsTATE & FOREiGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., REPORT OF THE ADviSORY
CoMMrTrEE ON CoRPoRATE DIsCLosuRE TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE CoMMIS-
SION 347 (Comm. Print 1977), abstracted in [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L.
Rep. (CCH) 81,357, at 88,667 (Nov. 3, 1977)). Forward-looking statements are
often classified as a subset of "soft information," which consists of subjective informa-
tion of a prospective or non-prospective nature. See Romajas, supra, at S245 n.5.
4 Cox ET AL., supra note 1, at 71.
5 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, 749, 753 (1995) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77z-2, 78u-5 (Supp. IV 1998)).
6 "Reporting companies" consist generally of the following classifications of com-
panies: (1) companies with a class of securities listed on a national securities ex-
change, 15 U.S.C. § 781(a) (1994), (2) companies with assets greater than $10 million
that have a class of equity securities held by at least 500 persons, id. § 781(g); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.12g-1 (2000), and (3) companies that have filed a registration statement under
the Securities Act of 1933 that has become effective, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998).
7 See William 0. Fisher & Terry Kee, Companies Still Grapple With Safe-Harbor Is-
sues, NAT'L LJ., June 22, 1998, at B10, B11 & n.23 (noting a study that revealed in-
creased sales and earnings forecasts); NIRI Survey Finds Improved Disclosure of Soft Info in
News Releases, SEC Filings, 30 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 896 (1998) (reporting on a
[VOL. 76:-2
NOTE: ITEM 303'S ROLE IN SECURITIES LAW
and (2) plaintiffs' attorneys8 have had to pursue creative alternatives
in order to establish a company's liability for misstatements and omis-
sions regarding forward-looking statements. 9 For the plaintiff's attor-
ney seeking recovery in a securities cause of action, the first effect has
provided a deluge of forward-looking statements that could potentially
result in extensive liability to the company, however, the availability of
safe-harbor provisions for these statements has turned the deluge into
a trickle in terms of what could actually result in liability to the
company.
Although attorneys still aggressively pursue causes of action re-
lated to forward-looking statements,' 0 most commentators agree that
the statutory safe-harbor protection will reduce instances of liability in
these cases."' The fact that forward-looking statements receive such a
high degree of protection must be particularly frustrating for an attor-
ney pursuing a securities cause of action because such statements can
easily prove wrong, or at least not completely correct, thus potentially
indicating a misstatement or omission. But the protection of forward-
looking statements is not an entirely new problem for plaintiffs' attor-
neys-courts developed a "bespeaks caution" doctrine before any stat-
utory protection developed, 12 and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) promulgated a safe harbor for forward-looking
statements under Rule 175.13 Needless to say, plaintiffs' attorneys had
already developed several alternative theories to get around these safe
harbors.
study that indicated a significant increase since 1995 in the number of companies
willing to provide "soft information" or projections).
8 As this Note is limited to a discussion of securities lam, any reference to "plain-
tiffs' attorneys" will mean an attorney who represents a private plaintiff in a federal
securities cause of action.
9 SeeJohn C. Coffee,Jr., TheFuture of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Or,
Why the Fat Lady Has Not Yet Sung, 51 Bus. LAw. 975, 992-95 (1996); Richard M. Phil-
lips & Gilbert C. Miller, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Rbalancing
Litigation Risks and Rewards for Class Action Plaintiffs, Defendants and Lauyersi 51 Bus.
I-w. 1009, 1051-56 (1996).
10 See, e.g., In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., 1 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1103 (D. Nev.
1998); Harris v. IVAX Corp., 998 F. Supp. 1449, 1450-52 (S.D. Fa. 1998).
11 See Phillips & Miller, supra note 9, at 1051; Carl IV. Schneider &Jay A. Dubow,
Forward-Looking Information-Navigating in the Safe Harbor, 51 Bus. LAw. 1071, 1096
(1996). Note, however, that the statutory safe harbor does not apply to any forward-
looking statement made in connection with an initial public offering. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 77z-2(b) (2) (D) (Supp. IV 1998).
12 See, eg., In re DonaldJ. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 371-73 (3d Cir.
1993); Sinay v. Liamson & Sessions Co., 948 F.2d 1037, 1040 (6th Cir. 1991).
13 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (2000).
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One of these alternatives, and the one upon which this Note fo-
cuses, is an allegation of a violation of "Item 303." 14 Item 303 requires
a company that files certain documents with the SEC to discuss, in its
"Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and
Results of Operations" (MD&A) section, known trends and uncertain-
ties that affect the company's liquidity, capital resources, and results
of operations.1 5 Although at first blush the regulation seems to re-
quire disclosure of all forward-looking information, the use of the
word "known" operates purportedly as a distinction between disclo-
sures grounded in current knowledge and purely predictive disclo-
sures.' 6 This distinction is hazy, however, because even with
mandatory disclosures reporting companies must describe the known
trend or uncertainty's effects on future operations. 17
This hazy distinction serves as the bullet in the attorney's revolver
that allows for a retrospective look at a company's disclosures in
MD&A that might reveal a misstatement or an omission of a required
disclosure with no safe-harbor protection. Although mandatory for-
ward-looking statements-that is, predictions of future effects of cur-
rently known trends or uncertainties-made in MD&A constitute
protected statements under the statutory safe harbor,18 if manage-
ment fails to make any statement in MD&A regarding a particular un-
14 Id. § 229.303. The term "Item 303" refers to the regulation's placement within
Regulation S-K, id. §§ 229.10-.915, which dictates the type and extent of information
that companies must include in various filings with the SEC.
15 Id. § 229.303.
16 See id. § 229.303(a) inst. 7; infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
17 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (a) (3) (ii) (2000) (citing as an example of a re-
quired disclosure "known future increases" in costs of labor and materials); Gregory
S. Porter, What Did You Know and When Did You Know It?: Public Company Disclosure and
the MythicalDuties to Correct and Update, 68 FoRDHAm L. REV. 2199, 2219 n.116 (2000)
(stating that the line between disclosure of "presently known trends... expected to
[a]ffect future earnings" and disclosure of other forward-looking information "is
often blurry") (citing Mark S. Croft, MD&A: The Tightrope ofDisclosure, 45 S.C. L. REV.
477, 484-86 (1994)).
18 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(i) (1) (C), 78u-5(i)(1)(C) (Supp. IV 1998). These sec-
tions define a forward-looking statement as any statement of "future economic per-
formance," including statements in a "discussion and analysis of financial condition"
included pursuant to rules and regulations of the SEC. Before the statutory safe har-
bor was enacted, the SEC stated that mandatory Item 303 disclosures received protec-
tion as forward-looking statements under Rules 175 and 3b-6. See Management's
Discussion and Analysis, Securities Act Release No. 6835, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,427, 22,429
& n.22 (May 18, 1989). The same "future economic performance" language used in
the enacted statutes appears in those rules. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.175(c) (3), 240.3b-
6(c) (3) (2000). Thus, a reasonable conclusion is that, at least as far as the SEC is
concerned, mandatory Item 303 disclosures of forward-looking information will re-
ceive protection under the statutory safe harbor.
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certainty or trend the safe harbor would not apply to the statement."9
Put another way, the statutory safe harbor does not protect statements
that were never made.20 Thus, a plaintiff's attorney could scan prior
SEC filings and, to the extent that the attorney can tie the trend, un-
certainty, or event to a subsequent change in stock price, the defend-
ing company would not have the ability to use the statutory safe
harbor. The potency of the bullet is intensified by the fact that courts
have held consistently that violations of mandatory disclosures within
Item 303 establish the "duty to disclose" element of a securities cause
of action.
2'
Despite its potential as a liability-imposing device, courts that
have entertained allegations of Item 303 violations have returned
somewhat mixed results. While some courts have focused attention
on whether an Item 303 violation can give rise to an independent
cause of action, 22 at least one court held that allegations of Item 303
violations support a claim under sections 112 and 12(a) (2)24 of the
Securities Act of 1933.25 Most courts, however, have merely taken the
middle road and held that allegations of Item 303 violations in combi-
nation with other factors could support a securities liability claim.2 r6
The mixed results from the courts in securities cases involving
Item 303 violation allegations are not surprising. The confusion stems
19 In general, safe-harbor protection applies when management identifies the
statement as forward-looking and provides "meaningful cautionary statements." S~e
15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(c) (1), 78u-5(c) (1) (Supp. IV 1998).
20 See Coffee, supra note 9, at 993-95 (discussing the possibility of potential liabil-
ity for an omission in MD&A).
21 See, &g., Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1296-97 (9th Cir.
1998); Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1222 & n.37 (Ist Cir. 1996).
22 See In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1418 n.7 (3d Cir.
1997) ("It is an open issue whether violations of Item 303 create an independent
cause of action for private plaintiffs."); In reWells Fargo Sec. Litig., 12 F.3d 922, 930
n.6 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that plaintiffs acknowledge "that Regulation S-K does not
provide an independent cause of action").
23 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
24 Id. § 771(a)(2).
25 Steckman, 143 F.3d at 1296.
26 See Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1222 & n.37 (holding that a violation of a SEC reporting
requirement, if material, is actionable in a Rule 10b-5 cause of action); Wallace v. Sys.
& Computer Tech. Corp., [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 1
99,212, at 95,079 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 1996) (Mem.) (noting that although an Item 303
violation does not inevitably lead to liability under Rule 10b-5, the information vas
not so unimportant as to allow the court to deem it immaterial as a matter of law);
Simon v. Am. Power Conversion Corp., 945 F. Supp. 416, 431 & n.20 (D.R.I. 1996)
(relying on the "uncontroversial proposition" that an affirmative duty to disclose ma-
terial information, whatever the source of the duty, is actionable under the securities
lawvs).
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mainly from the unclear disclosure standard the SEC developed for
Item 303,27 as well as from the varying statutory and court-developed
standards of liability that control in private causes of action under the
securities laws.28 This Note addresses much of the uncertainty sur-
rounding allegations of Item 303 violations in private causes of action
under the securities laws. Furthermore, this Note will attempt to de-
velop a workable standard of review that courts can use when
presented with such allegations.
Part I of this Note provides a brief introduction to the various
filing requirements imposed upon companies under the statutes and
rules of the federal securities laws, including an explanation of Item
303's role in these filings. Part I also discusses Item 303's specific re-
quirements regarding disclosure of known trends and uncertainties.
Part II compares Item 303's disclosure standards to materiality stan-
dards developed under other aspects of the federal securities laws.
This discussion highlights the difference between materiality, based
largely upon Supreme Court decisions, and Item 303's disclosure stan-
dard. The analysis in Part II will show that Item 303's disclosure stan-
dard is highly fact-specific and is such that a court cannot simply
conclude that a violation of the standard should or should not result
automatically in liability in a private cause of action. Part III consists
of background on the various provisions of the federal securities laws
that provide relief to investors in private causes of action, and it ex-
plains how Item 303 fits within the liability scheme. Part IV attempts
to develop a framework, based in part upon principles drawn from
Professor Melvin Eisenberg's article regarding standards of conduct
and standards of review in corporate law,29 that will allow courts to
decide cases involving allegations of Item 303 violations.
I. ITEM 303's RoLE UNDER FIUNG REQUiREMENTS OF THE FEDERAL
SECURmES LAws
A. Where Must Companies Make Item 303 Disclosures?
Companies must file reports with the SEC, and in some instances
must send certain documents to shareholders, in a number of situa-
tions. Under authority of sections 13(a)30 and 15(d)31 of the Securi-
27 See discussion infra Part II.
28 See discussion infra Part III.A-D.
29 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of
Review in Corporate Law, 62 FoRDHAM L. REV. 437 (1993).
30 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1994). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is codified at
id. §§ 78a-78mm (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
31 Id. § 78o(d) (1994).
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ties Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), the SEC promulgated
rules requiring companies to file annual reports on Form 10-K, quar-
terly reports on Form 10-Q, and periodic reports on Form 8-K to dis-
close relevant financial matters.32 In the context of public offerings,
sections 7 and 19(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act)4
provide the SEC with similar authority to promulgate rules and regula-
tions related to the filing of registration statements.m Finally, Rule
14a-3, promulgated under section 14(a) of the Exchange Act, requires
companies to send shareholders an annual report prior to any proxy
solicitation that relates to an annual shareholders' meeting.35
In 1980, the SEC integrated the filing requirements under the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act by placing disclosure require-
ments for both Acts in Regulation S-K-s 6 Generally, under the SEC's
integrated disclosure system, all SEC filings that include financial in-
formation also must include information required by Regulation S-K;
specifically, these filings must include Item 303 of Regulation S-K.
3 7
Additionally, under Rule 14a-3 (b), the annual report must include the
MD&A section required by Item 303.38 Item 303 of Regulation S-K
contains the disclosure requirements for MD&A 39 Thus, disclosures,
or lack thereof, within Item 303 can affect a company's liability in rela-
tion to periodic filings, proxy statements, as well as registration state-
ments made in the context of public offerings.
32 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-1, 240.13a-1, 240.13a-13 (2000). The companies sub-
ject to the periodic filing requirements of section 13 are the same three classifications
of companies named in supra note 6.
33 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77s(a) (1994).
34 See iU. §§ 7 7g, 77s. The Securities Act of 1933 is codified at id. §§ 77a to 77z-3
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
35 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (2000). Section 14 of the Exchange Act only applies
to companies registered under sections 12(b) and 12(g) of the Exchange Act. &e id.
§ 240.14a-2. Thus companies required to file periodic reports under section 15(d) of
the Exchange Act are not subject to the proxy rules. Section 15(d) companies are
those whose stock is traded "over-the-counter" and have fewer than 500 shareholders
and/or less than $10 million in assets. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1994); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.12g-1 (2000).
36 See Integration of Securities Acts Disclosure Systems, Securities Act Release No.
33-6231, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,630 (Sept. 25, 1980).
37 See, eg., SEcurrIEs AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, FoRiM S-1, REGISrRATION STATE-
iMrir U-DER THE SEcuRrrms ACT OF 1933, pt. 1, it. 11 (h), in 2 Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH)
7121, at 6239 (1999); SEcuarrms AND EXCHANGE CO.M'N, Fopmu 10-K, ANNUAL RE-
PORT PURSUANT TO SECrION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURMFES EXCHNGE Aar OF 1934,
pt. I, it. 7, in 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 31,107, at 22,067 (1999).
38 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b) (5) (ii) (2000).
39 Id § 229.303.
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B. What Must Companies Disclose Pursuant to Item 303?
Item 303's disclosure requirements focus on three particular sub-
jects: (1) liquidity; (2) capital resources; and (3) results of opera-
tions.40 For each subject, the company's management must identify
"known trends" that are "reasonably likely" to have a material effect.4 1
In an effort to avoid bright-line materiality and disclosure standards
that companies could potentially manipulate through various means
(for example, off balance sheet financing), the SEC intentionally
wrote Item 303 with flexible and general requirements. 42 Given these
general requirements, it is not surprising that reporting companies
have had a difficult time determining just what information to
disclose.
43
Perhaps the first question in analyzing whether Item 303 requires
disclosure of a particular piece of information is: What exactly is a
known "trend" or "uncertainty"? The SEC provides some concrete ex-
amples in an administrative release, but some might ponder their ap-
plicability to the real world: reduction in product prices; erosion in
market share; changes in insurance coverage; environmental liabili-
ties; or the likely non-renewal of a material contract.44 A more en-
lightening viewpoint of what the SEC considers a trend or uncertainty
40 Id. § 229.303(a) (1)-(3). Specifically, the regulation requires the following:
(1) Liquidity. Identify any known trends or any known... events or uncer-
tainties that will result in or that are reasonably likely to result in ...
liquidity increasing or decreasing in any material way....
(2) Capital Resources .... Describe any known material trends, favorable
or unfavorable, in the registrant's capital resources. Indicate any ex-
pected material changes in the mix and relative cost ....
(3) Results of operations.... Describe any known trends or uncertainties
that have had or that the registrant reasonably expects will have a mate-
rial favorable or unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or income
from continuing operations.
Id. Practically all of the case law related to Item 303 issues deals with disclosures
related to results of operations; therefore, this Note will typically refer to that aspect
of Item 303, but the same analysis applies to liquidity and capital resource disclosures.
41 Id. § 229.303 (a) (1), (a) (2) (ii), (a) (3) (ii). The SEC intended management to
use MD&A to provide investors with an "enhanced understanding" of financial infor-
mation. Id. § 229.303(a) instr. 1.
42 See Management's Discussion and Analysis, Securities Act Release No. 6835, 54
Fed. Reg. 22,427, 22,436 (May 18, 1989) [hereinafter 1989 Release].
43 According to the 1989 Release, the SEC reviewed the filings of 218 companies
and issued 206 letters of comment regarding deficiencies in Item 303 disclosure. See
id., 54 Fed. Reg. at 22,428.
44 Concept Release on Management's Discussion and Analysis, Securities Act Re-
lease No. 6711, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,715, 13,717 (Apr. 24, 1987) [hereinafter 1987
Release].
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can be derived by reviewing a few of the administrative proceedings
the SEC has pursued against alleged Item 303 violators. Some exam-
ples include failing to disclose forward-looking information regarding
exposure and risks associated with loan repurchase transactions4 fail-
ure to discuss inventory obsolescence,46 and a failure to disclose the
reliance of the development of a microprocessor upon copyrighted
technology.47
Perhaps the most infamous trend occurred in a SEC administra-
tive proceeding against Caterpillar.48 Ridiculously high inflation in
Brazil and a favorable exchange rate greatly benefited Caterpillar's
Brazil operations during 1989.49 When a new administration took
over the Brazilian government, Caterpillar's internal management dis-
cussed the potential effects of the new Brazilian administration's poli-
cies on 1990 income results with the board of directors, but
Caterpillar's filings with the SEC contained no disclosures regarding
the Brazil operations.50 When Caterpillar's Brazilian earnings
dropped substantially, the SEC brought an enforcement action. Al-
though no accounting provisions (under either the SEC or Financial
Accounting Standards Board principles) required Caterpillar to re-
port its Brazil operations on a segmented basis,5 ' the SEC claimed that
the possibility that the past trend of higher eamings in Brazil would
cease should have been disclosed in MD&A. 52 Due to management's
and the board's knowledge of the trend, the SEC found that the fail-
ure to disclose resulted in a deficient Item 303 disclosure thus leading
to a violation of the reporting requirements of section 13(a) of the
Exchange Act 53
The purported known trends and uncertainties that appear in
private causes of action tend not to take on the crystal-clear form
found in In re Caterpillar, Inc. In fact, courts analyzing these issues
45 See In re Am. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, Exchange Act Release No. 25,788, 41 SEC
Docket (CGH) 78 (June 8, 1988).
46 See In re Burroughs Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 21,872, 32 SEC Docket
(CCH) 935 (Mar. 20, 1985).
47 See In re Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 37,730, 62
SEC Docket (CCH) 2468 (Sept. 26, 1996).
48 In re Caterpillar, Inc., SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No.
363, [1991-1995 Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,830 (Mifar. 31, 1992).
49 Id. at 63,051-52.
50 Id. at 63,052.
51 This is due to the fact that the Brazilian subsidiary comprised less than ten
percent of the total assets and revenues of Caterpillar. &e id. at 63,055 & n.9.
52 Id at 63,055.
53 Id. at 63,056.
20011
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
have arrived at contradictory results. Where declining sales were a
sufficient trend in one case,54 they were insufficient to survive a mo-
tion to dismiss in another.55 Similarly contrasting, a defect in a com-
pany's software product in one case could not meet the requirement
of a known trend leading to the dismissal of the claim,5 6 while the
same type of claim survived a motion to dismiss in another cause of
action.
57
Even this limited review of SEC actions and cases reveals that the
list of information that resides under the "known trends and uncer-
tainties" umbrella is as varied as the number of industries that file with
the SEC. Even if a reporting company can sort out what its "trends or
uncertainties" are, Item 303 still might not necessarily mandate disclo-
sure. Reporting companies do not generally have to disclose forward-
looking information, but, according to the SEC, Item 303 does pur-
portedly require certain types of predictions or projections., 8 The
SEC states that the distinction between optional and required disclo-
sures "rests with the nature of the prediction required" 9 and attempts
to separate the two with the following explanation: "Required disclo-
sure is based on currently known trends, events, and uncertainties that
are reasonably expected to have material effects . . . . In contrast,
optional forward-looking disclosure involves anticipating a future
trend or event or anticipating a less predictable impact of a known
event, trend, or uncertainty."60
According to the SEC, a given known trend or uncertainty can
have any number of future impacts with a lessening degree of predict-
ability. The results are fact- and industry-specific, a point that takes on
increased relevance in Part IV.
In 1989, the SEC attempted to provide reporting companies with
some guidance for determining what disclosures Item 303 requires in
a release on MD&A (1989 Release). 61 Perhaps the most important
component of the 1989 Release was the SEC's proposed two-pronged
analysis used to determine whether Item 303 requires disclosure of a
54 In reNext Level Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 97-C7362, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5653,
at *22 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 1999).
55 In reVerifone Sec. Litig., 11 F.3d 865, 869 (9th Cir. 1993).
56 Wallace v. Sys. & Computer Tech. Corp., [1997-1998 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,578, at 97,880 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 1997) (Mem.).
57 SeeSimon v. Am. Power Conversion Corp., 945 F. Supp. 416, 431 (D.R.I. 1996).
58 See 1987 Release, supra note 44, 52 Fed. Reg. at 13,717 ("Both required disclo-
sure regarding the impact of presently known trends ... and optional forward-looking
information may involve some prediction or projection.").
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 See 1989 Release, supra note 42.
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known trend or uncertainty.62 Despite the standard's logical two-step
process, negotiating the prongs with real-world business situations is
actually quite complicated. For one, both prongs contain maddening
double negatives; beyond this annoyance, the second prong superim-
poses a "reasonably likely" test onto a materiality standard.a3 Perhaps
due to these complications, courts rarely use the two-prong analysis in
Item 303 cases; for those courts that have, the analysis takes on enor-
mous importance in determining whether a company is liable in a
securities action.6
]I. ITEM 303's Fuzzy DIscIosuRE STANDARD
A federal securities cause of action requires, at a minimum, a mis-
statement or omission of a material fact.6 In cases involving an omis-
sion of a material fact, a plaintiff must also establish a duty to
disclose.66 A duty to disclose can arise when a statute or regulation
requires disclosure.67 Thus, because Item 303 is a required disclosure
within the SEC's integrated disclosure regulations, Item 303 impli-
62 According to the 1989 Release:
Where a trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty is known, man-
agement must make two assessments: (1) Is the known trend, demand, com-
mitment, event or uncertainty likely to come to fruition? If management
determines that it is not reasonably likely to occur, no disclosure is required.
(2) If management cannot make that determination, it must e-aluate objec-
tively the consequences of the known trend, demand, commitment, event or
uncertainty on the assumption that it will come to fruition. Disclosure is
then required unless management determines that a material effect... is
not reasonably likely to occur.
See id., 54 Fed. Reg. at 22,430.
63 See id.
64 See, e.g., Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1297-98 (9th Cir.
1998) (holding that an Item 303 violation is presumptively material, but finding that
the second prong of the 1989 Release's standard did not require disclosure); In re
Anchor Gaming Sec. Litig., 33 F. Supp. 2d 889,895 (D. Nev. 1999) (dismissing a claim
that the defendant violated Item 303 regarding adverse earning trends because the
defendant could not have recognized such a trend only two weeks into the quarter).
65 See infranotes 91-92, 97, 104, 122 and accompanying text. Note, however, that
a duty to disclose applies only where a plaintiff claims that a defendant made an
omission, rather than a misstatement.
66 See, e.g., Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1202 (1st Cir. 1996) (stat-
ing that the "mere possession of material nonpublic information does not create a
duty to disclose") (citing Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 1987)
(citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980))).
67 See, e.g., Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1202; In reTime Warner, Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259,
267 (2d Cir. 1993). Courts have alluded to three situations where a duty to disclose
might arise: (1) when insider trading occurs, (2) when a statute or regulation requires
disclosure, and (3) when a company previously made a statement of a material fact
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cates a duty to disclose.68 It follows then, that if Item 303 requires
disclosure of a certain trend or uncertainty, a failure to make the dis-
closure, if material, can establish at least one-and possibly two-of
the elements necessary for liability in a private cause of action under
the federal securities laws. Thb real issue therefore, and the one that
seems to create the most confusion with the courts, is whether all re-
quired Item 303 disclosures are material under the federal securities
laws.
A. Existing Standards of Materiality Under Federal Securities Laws
In Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, the Supreme Court stated that material
information under the federal securities laws is that information for
which there is a "substantial likelihood" that it would have "been
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the
'total mix' of information." 69 In Basic, the Court stated further that,
in the context of merger negotiations, materiality will depend upon a
balancing of the probability and the magnitude of any particular un-
certainty.70 Although the Basic decision applied only to merger nego-
tiations, lower courts have extrapolated Basic's probability/magnitude
test to situations involving the prediction of other types of future
results.71
B. "Materiality" Standard for Item 303 Disclosure
Because Item 303 contemplates disclosure of the future effects of
trends and uncertainties, it seems sensible to compare its standard to
that of Basics test, which is intended to be used to measure the mate-
riality of future events. However, a simple comparison of the literal
that is misleading "in light of undisclosed information." See, e.g., Shaw, 82 F.3d at
1202 n.3; Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 267-68.
68 See Simon v. Am. Power Conversion Corp., 945 F. Supp. 416, 431 (D.R.I. 1996).
69 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (adopting expressly the standard of materiality
stated in TSCIndustries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,449 (1976), for the section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 context). Similarly, and likely not coincidentally, the SEC's
definition of "material" for purposes of registration and reporting limits the inforna-
tion to "those matters to which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
investor would attach importance" in deciding whether to buy or sell a security. 17
C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2000).
70 Basic, 485 U.S. at 238, 250.
71 See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Class E Stock Buyout Sec. Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1119,
1127-29 (D. Del. 1988) (applying the Basic test to statements regarding the com-
pany's internal restructuring); see also Cox Er AL., supra note 1, at 71 (stating that
"there is every reason to believe" that the materiality of soft information, including
fonvard-looking statements, "should be assessed by the probability/magnitude stan-
dard in Basic").
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language of the SEC's two-step analysis in the 1989 Release to the Su-
preme Court's language in Basic reveals a marked difference betveen
the two standards. First, the Supreme Court uses the term "substantial
likelihood;"7 2 this language connotes a higher standard for materiality
than does the "reasonably likely" language of the 1989 Release. Sec-
ond, the two-pronged analysis of the 1989 Release seems to break the
Basic probability/magnitude test into two parts: the first prong ad-
dresses only the probability of the uncertainty, while the second prong
addresses only the magnitude. In fact, the SEC stated in the 1989
Release that the probability/magnitude test for materiality "is inappo-
site" to Item 303 disclosure.73
The inapplicability of the Basic test to the two-pronged analysis in
the 1989 Release appears self-evident, because the first step makes no
mention of the magnitude of the trend or uncertainty-under the
1989 Release, management does not consider the magnitude of the
trend or uncertainty until the second prong. On the other hand, the
Basic test contemplates the magnitude of the uncertainty no matter
what the level of probability might be. Thus, the SEC's two-pronged
analysis for Item 303 disclosure does not purport to determine
whether or not particular information is material, but only provides
management with a duty to disclose information that may or may not
be material.
Yet even if Item 303 does not purport to make all of its required
disclosures material, it could be possible that working through the
1989 Release's analysis with any given set of facts demonstrates that
Item 303 has a higher threshold for disclosure than does normal ma-
teriality. If Item 303's threshold for disclosure is always higher than
that of normal materiality, then the set of required disclosures under
Item 303 would always necessarily include disclosures required by nor-
mal materiality. Thus, the logical conclusion would be that any viola-
tion of Item 303 is per se a material violation of a duty to disclose.74
Working through the requirements of the 1989 Release, however,
does not seem to result in all required disclosures being material; thus
negating the tempting efficacy of such a conclusion.
72 Basc, 485 U.S. at 231.
73 1989 Release, supra note 42, 54 Fed. Reg. at 22,430 n.27.
74 This parallels somewhat the conclusion of the court in Stedman v. Hart Brew-
ing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1998). See infra text accompan)ing notes
169-74.
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1. Fleshing Out the 1989 Release's Two-Prong Analysis
Before attempting to work through a given scenario, an under-
standing of the "nuts and bolts" of the 1989 Release's two-prong analy-
sis requires development. As noted, the first prong of the analysis
requires management to determine whether the uncertainty is likely
to come to fruition; if management determines it is not reasonably
likely to occur, no disclosure is required.' 5 Professor TedJ. Fiflis pro-
poses that the first prong should require management to assume the
probability at 100% unless it can determine the likelihood is "close to
zero,"7 6 while former SEC Commissioner Edward H. Fleischman sug-
gests that "reasonably likely" exists in the 40% probability range.77
Under Fiflis's formulation, an occurrence that management deter-
mines has a probability of 20% might be close enough to zero to merit
non-disclosure; under Fleischman's 40% standard, the same
probability is such that management can determine that the event is
not reasonably likely to occur. Perhaps the most important point to
take from both formulations is that if the likelihood of an uncertainty
coming to fruition approaches or exceeds 40%, management cannot
deem it "reasonably likely not to occur" and will therefore have to
proceed to the second prong.
Once management has determined that the probability of an un-
certainty or trend is either indeterminable or too likely to call it "not
reasonably likely to occur," the second prong requires management to
evaluate objectively the consequences of the known trend or uncer-
tainty; disclosure is required unless management determines a mate-
rial effect is not reasonably likely to occur.78 Using Fiflis's
formulation-and the literal language of the second prong-manage-
ment must simply compare the expected effect of the trend or uncer-
tainty in dollars to the usual dollar amount for materiality to
determine whether the second prong mandates disclosure. At this
point, it seems clear that Item 303's threshold for disclosure is lower
than the Basic standard because management can no longer discount
the magnitude of the uncertainty with a probability factor.
75 See 1989 Release, supra note 42, 54 Fed. Reg. at 22,430; supra note 61.
76 Ted J. Fiflis, Financial Statements, the Management's Discussion and Analysis
(MDO&'A), and the Accounting Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA"), C533
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 751, 760 (1990).
77 See Edward H. Fleischman, The Intersection of Business Needs and Disclosure
Requirements: MD&A, Address at the Eleventh Annual Southern Securities Institute
12 (Mar. 1, 1991), cited in Romajas, supra note 3, at S256 n.83.
78 1989 Release, supra note 42, 54 Fed. Reg. at 22,430; supra note 61.
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Relying on Fiflis's and Fleischman's assertions, one commentator
reasons that, as between Basices probability/magnitude test and Item
303's two-pronged analysis, Item 303 has a lower threshold for disclo-
sure.79 However, at least one other commentator states that Item 303
has an equivalent or higher threshold for disclosure than "ordinary"
materiality.8 0 One underlying reason for the latter conclusion is that
the two-pronged analysis provides management with a "business judg-
ment layer of protection."8 ' This reasoning seems off the mark
though, because the 1989 Release states that management's determi-
nations "must be objectively reasonable, viewed as of the time the de-
termination is made."82 Thus, even though management must use its
own judgment in making determinations of "reasonably likely," those
determinations would be subject to a court's, or perhaps the SEC's,
assessment of management's judgment. Furthermore, stating that
Item 303 posits a higher threshold for disclosure means that there
would be known trends, events, and uncertainties about which normal
materiality requires disclosure but that never cross the Item 303
threshold. This reasoning belies the SEC's statement that MD&A




Interesting as they may be, abstract speculations about higher or
lower standards for disclosure are not extremely helpful for the man-
agement of a company that must determine whether to disclose a par-
ticular uncertainty. Like many other aspects of the law, including
securities law, the facts and circumstances will often provide the ulti-
mate answer. Take, for example, a company that is approaching the
time for renewal of a government contract that provides substantially
all of the company's revenues. If management determines that a 20%
likelihood exists that the government will not renew the contract, it
would seem that the uncertainty is not reasonably likely to occur.
Therefore, the first prong of the 1989 Release's analysis would not
79 See Romajas, supra note 3, at S256.
80 Mitu Gulati, When Corporate Managers Fear a Good Thing is Corning to an End: The
Case ofInterim Nondisdosure, 46 UCLA L RE%,. 675, 726 (1999) (stating that the "set of
information that Item 303 defines as ripe and ready to be disclosed is a subset of the set
of all material information").
81 Id,
82 1989 Release, supra note 42, 54 Fed. Reg. at 22,430 (footnote omitted).
83 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) instr. 1 (2000) (stating that discussion and analysis
shall be of information the registrant believes will "enhance a reader's understanding
of its financial condition").
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require disclosure. Unlike the 1989 Release's analysis, the Basic test
considers the magnitude in conjunction with the probability; a 20%
probability that a company will lose all its revenue would seem to cross
Basic's "substantial likelihood" of being material. On these facts then,
management might have to disclose the possibility of the non-renewal
of the contract despite there being no duty to disclose under Item
303; this scenario suggests the conclusion that Item 303 has a higher
threshold for disclosure than does normal materiality.
Just as easily envisaged is a situation where Item 303 mandates
disclosure but normal materiality would not. For example, manage-
ment determines that a 30% chance exists that a lawsuit will result in a
judgment affecting potentially 15% of the company's assets. 8 4 Be-
cause, at least under Professor Fiflis's formulation, management can-
not determine the loss is not reasonably likely to occur, management
must then assume the loss will occur and consider the financial ef-
fects. In this instance, management will probably not be able to say
that a potential loss of 15% of the company's assets is not reasonably
likely to have a material effect; therefore, the 1989 Release and Item
303 mandate disclosure. Normal materiality may or may not require
disclosure in this instance because the 15% potential loss is dis-
counted by the 30% probability; but the point is that Item 303 defi-
nitely mandates disclosure that normal materiality might not. This
conclusion suggests that Item 303, at least in some cases, has a lower
threshold for disclosure than does normal materiality. It stands to rea-
son then, that disclosures required under Item 303 do not always im-
plicate normal materiality standards; thus violation of Item 303's duty
to disclose does not per se render a misstatement or omission material.
III. ITEM 303 AS A COMPONENT OF LABimnrY IN PRIVATE CAUSES OF
ACTION UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
Given the difference in opinions among commentators regarding
Item 303's disclosure standards, it should come as no surprise that
courts have had a difficult time deciding what to do with allegations of
an Item 303 violation. Because the main battle in securities litigation
cases centers on the motion to dismiss, the courts have taken a rather
cautious approach to deciding the issue one way or the other. With
the exception of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Steckrnan v.
84 Although disclosure of material legal proceedings is required separately from
MD&A, see id. § 229.103, the 1989 Release states that MD&A should contain a discus-
sion of all "material impacts upon financial condition or results of operations, includ-
ing those arising from disclosure provided elsewhere in the filing." 1989 Release,
supra note 42, 54 Fed. Reg. at 22,428 n.14.
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Hart Brewing, Inc.,8 5 and to a lesser extent the First Circuit in Shaw v.
Digital Equipment Corp.,8 6 courts have avoided any specific holdings re-
garding Item 303's status within the framework of securities liability.
Instead, courts have typically preferred to determine whether the par-
ticular disclosure implicated a "trend" or "uncertainty" within the
meaning of Item 303, or whether the particular information was truly
"fonvard-looking" and thus not mandatory under Item 303.87 Al-
though standards of review can be malleable, a cynical observer might
view these approaches as a way of deciding cases based upon findings
of fact, thus rendering the decisions more difficult to overturn upon
review.
Whatever the reason for courts' reluctance to decide this issue,
what is most important is that Item 303's role in affecting liability in
private securities actions remains largely undefined in most circuits.
Although this lack of definition might have a great deal to do with
Item 303's nebulous disclosure standard, another possible explana-
tion is that standards of liability in securities cases vary greatly from
one provision to the next. Because both registration statements
under the Securities Act and periodic reports under the Exchange Act
require Item 303 disclosure, decisions regarding Item 303 overlap the
negligence provisions of the Securities Act with the antifraud provi-
sions of the Exchange Act. This overlap contributes to Item 303's con-
tinuing lack of definition because, for example, a court cannot readily
transplant a decision in a Rule 10b-5 case-which has aspects of
fraud-into an action under section 11 of the Securities Act-which
implicates a negligence standard.ss However, a detailed look at the
various liability provisions reveals that a novel concept-reading the
statutes and rules themselves-can help to clear at least some of the
confusion. This Part will provide background on the various private
causes of action under the securities laws that might implicate liability
for deficient Item 303 disclosure. With this background as a basis for
85 143 F.3d 1293 (9th Cir. 1998).
86 82 F.3d 1194 (1st Cir. 1996).
87 Se, ag., In re Sofamor Danek Group, Inc., 123 F.3d 394, 402 (6th Cir. 1997)
(stating that the defendant had no way of knowing "iith the degree of assurance"
implied by Item 303 that certain merchandising practices would have a material ad-
verse impact upon future earnings and therefore implicated information that vas
"fonvard-looking"); Oran v. Stafford, 34 F. Supp. 2d 906, 912 n.6 (D.NJ. 1999) (hold-
ing that adverse medical reports concerning one drug manufactured by a phanrmaceu-
tical company was not a trend or uncertainty); In re Canandaigua Sec. iUtig., 944 F.
Supp. 1202, 1209-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating that the pricing of a company's new
product below the market level of competitors was a "far cry" from creating a trend or
uncertainty obligating disclosure).
88 See infra Part lIIIA-B.
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comparison, this Part will then analyze how courts have treated Item
303 and its place within the liability framework, with particular focus
on the contrast between the Steckman and Shaw decisions.
A. Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 Causes of Action:
Secondqty Market Sales
Promulgated under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act,89 Rule
10b-5 is the primary tool available to investors to seek recovery for
misstatements or omissions in connection with the purchase of a se-
curity.90 The "in connection with" language serves as the touchstone
that allows sellers and purchasers on the secondary market, for exam-
ple, national stock exchanges, to bring a cause of action for a Rule
10b-5 violation. Although not expressly stated in the statute or the
rule promulgated thereunder, it is now accepted beyond question that
Rule 10b-5 provides an implied private cause of action to persons who
buy or sell stock on the secondary market.91
Of course, merely losing money on stock does not allow an inves-
tor who has received the short end of the stick to walk into court and
collect. To maintain a Rule 10b-5 cause of action, a plaintiff must
generally plead the following: (1) the defendant made an untrue
statement of a material fact or omitted a material fact necessary to
make the statements made not misleading, (2) the defendant had the
requisite scienter, and (3) the omission or misstatement caused the
plaintiff's injury.92 Alternatively, when there is a duty to disclose in-
formation to shareholders, an issuer that fails to disclose material facts
violates Rule 10b-5(c) when the omission is intentional or reckless. 93
Although courts initially resisted ruling Item 303 allegations as suffi-
89 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
90 Rule 10b-5(b) prohibits, in connection with the purchase or sale of any secur-
ity, any use of an instrumentality of interstate commerce "to make any untrue state-
ment of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2000).
91 See Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1216-17; see also Cox ET AL., supra note 1, at 682.
92 See In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1417 (3d Cir.
1997).
93 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c) (2000). This rule makes it unlawful, "in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale" of a security, to "engage in any act, practice, or course
of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or a deceit upon any person."
Id. The duty to disclose requirement applies only in cases where the plaintiff claims
an omission, rather than a misstatement, of a material fact. See, e.g., Shaw, 82 F.3d at
1201-02 (considering whether a duty to disclose existed in a Rule 101>5 action where
plaintiffs asserted that DEC should have disclosed unusually large losses that were not
reflected in the accompanying financial statements).
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cient for a Rule 10b-5 cause of action,94 the recent trend reveals courts
ruling that Item 303 violations can qualify for the duty to disclose ele-
ment.95 In a Rule 10b-5 cause of action therefore, once a plaintiff
establishes that an Item 303 omission was material, thus meeting the
duty to disclose and materiality elements, a successful cause of action
still requires that the plaintiff prove the scienter and causation ele-
ments. Regardless of any duty to disclose, an omission of a mandatory
Item 303 disclosure may render the financial statements misleading
and thereby amount to a violation of Rule 10b-5(b). 9G
B. Liability Under Section 11 of the Securities Act
At its most basic, section 11 of the Securities Act allows a pur-
chaser of stock in a public offering to recover for a material omission
or statement of an untrue fact in a registration statement.97 Unlike
94 See, e.g., In re Verifone Sec. Litig., 11 F.3d 865, 870 (9th Cir. 1993); Alfus v.
Pyramid Tech. Corp, 764 F. Supp. 598, 607-08 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
95 See, e.g., Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1998);
Simon v. Am. Power Conversion Corp., 945 F. Supp. 416, 431 (D.R.I. 1996).
96 Rule 101>5(b) makes it unlawful, "in connection with the purchase or sale" of a
security, to "make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit.., a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made ... not misleading." 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5(b) (2000). Although not a private cause of action, the SEC's action
against Caterpillar-wherein the SEC claimed that Caterpillar should have disclosed
information regarding its Brazilian subsidiary so as to make the financial statements
not misleading-represents a good example of a Rule 101>5 omission claim. Ste In re
Caterpillar, Inc., SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 363,
[1991-1995 Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,830, at 63,055-56 (Mar. 31, 1992); supra notes 48-53 and
accompanying text.
97 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1994). A registration statement is the document that a
company must file with the SEC prior to most selling activities in connection ith a
public offering. In general, the person acquiring the security can sue the company,
every person who signed the registration statement, underwriters, directors, and cer-
tain other professionals connected with the offering. See id. § 77k(a) (1)-(5). The
pertinent part of the statute states:
(a) In case ... the registration statement... contained an untrue state-
ment of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be
stated therein ... any person acquiring such security... may... sue-
(1) every person who signed the registration statement;
(2) every person who was a director...;
(3) every person who ... is named.., as being or about to become a
director... ;
(4) every accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any person whose
profession gives authority to a statement made by him...;
(5) every underwriter ....
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Rule 10b-5's focus on fraud, the liability provisions under section 11
demand generally that companies and others involved in a filing with
the SEC practice reasonable care and/or due diligence. Because of
this difference, section 11 does not impose the same scienter and reli-
ance elements required in a Rule 10b-5 cause of action.98 Thus, an
allegation of an Item 303 violation in a section 11 cause of action
could assume a paramount role in the plaintiffs case because all the
plaintiff really needs to show is that the omission was material and that
it was "required to be stated therein."99
Determining whether mandatory Item 303 disclosures are "re-
quired to be stated therein" entails a simple walk through the provi-
sions of the statutes and regulations of the Securities Act. Section
7(a) of the Securities Act provides authority to the SEC to require
information in a registration statement by rule or regulation. 100 The
integrated disclosure system developed by the SEC requires docu-
ments, including registration statements, filed under the Securities
Act to include the information mandated by Item 303.101 Thus, be-
cause companies must make Item 303 disclosures in the registration
statement, an allegation of an Item 303 violation gets a plaintiff half-
way to the finish line in a section 11 case. Of course, even if the plain-
tiff can establish materiality, the potential victory is subject to due
diligence defenses of the individual defendants. 0 2
C. Liability Under Section 12 of the Securities Act
A similar step-by-step analysis can be used to determine Item
303's effect on liability under sections 12(a) (1) and 12(a) (2). Be-
cause section 12(a) (2) represents the more prevalent of the two sec-
tion 12 causes of action, that section will be analyzed first. Section
12(a) (2) applies to offers and sales of securities by means of instru-
ments of interstate commerce. 10 3 Specifically, it allows an individual
who purchases the security by means of a prospectus to sue the seller
for any untrue statements of material facts or omissions of material
facts "necessary... to make the statements, in light of the circum-
stances they were made, not misleading."' 0 4 The term "prospectus" is
a term of art that generally includes within its definition any Written or
98 See Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1217.
99 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1994).
100 Id. § 77g(a).
101 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
102 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1994).
103 Id. § 77/(a) (2) (Supp. IV 1998).
104 Id.
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oral communication that offers to sell or confirms the sale of any
security.
05
Determining how Item 303 affects section 12(a) (2) liability again
merely requires a walk through the relevant provisions. Section
10(a) (1) of the Securities Act requires a prospectus to contain "the
information contained in the registration statement."'00 Assuming
then, that the plaintiff receives a prospectus that purportedly meets
the standards of section 10(a) (1), "information contained in the regis-
tration statement" certainly includes mandatory Item 303 disclo-
sures.107 Therefore, any omissions or misstatements related to
information that Item 303 mandates would constitute an omission or
misstatement under section 12(a) (2). Similar to section 11, a plaintiff
alleging an omission or misstatement in Item 303 would be able to
make a successful claim if the item is material without having to prove
scienter. Also similar to section 11, a section 12(a) (2) claim is subject
to a reasonable care defense, but also provides for a defense that states
the loss was caused by some factor other than the omission.10s
A bold attorney practicing in certain circuits could potentially use
section 12(a) (1) to obtain a shortcut to a finding of liability by using
an allegation of an omission of a mandatory Item 303 disclosure. Sec-
tion 12(a) (1) provides that an offeror or seller of a security may be
liable to the purchaser if the offer or sale is made in violation of sec-
tion 5 of the Securities Act.'0 9 The pertinent part of section 5 makes
it unlawful to use any means or instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce to transmit a prospectus unless the prospectus meets the re-
quirements of section 10 of the Securities Act.110 As noted supra,
section 10 requires the disclosures mandated by Item 303.111 Thus, an
omission of an Item 303 disclosure results in a prospectus not meeting
the requirements of section 10 and could therefore result in a viola-
tion of section 5; this, in turn, would meet the minimal requirement
for recovery under section 12(a) (1). In SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers,
Inc.,112 a SEC enforcement action, the Second Circuit used such a
reading of section 5 in finding that the defendant violated that sec-
105 See id. § 77b(a) (10). The Supreme Court limited the definition of a prospec-
tus under section 10 to "documents related to public offerings by an issuer or its
controlling shareholders." Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 569 (1995).
106 15 U.S.C. § 77j(a) (1) (1994).
107 See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
108 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2)-(b) (Supp. IV 1998).
109 Id. §771(a) (1).
110 Id. § 77e(b) (1) (1994). Note that section 5 contains no materiality limitation.
111 See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
112 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972).
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tion." 3 If Manor's holding were applied to a private cause of action, a
plaintiff could recover for an Item 303 omission and not even have to
prove the omission was material. However, at least one circuit has
criticized the decision in Manor for creating a per se violation of sec-
tion 12(a) (1) that renders sections 11 and 12(a) (2) of the Securities
Act meaningless.114 Despite the voices of dissent, the idea that an im-
material Item 303 omission could result in section 12(a) (1) liability
should concern a securities defense attorney.
D. Causes of Action Under Section 14 of the Exchange Act: Proxy Rules
Although the case law is sparse, an omission of a mandatory Item
303 disclosure could potentially result in liability under the Exchange
Act's proxy rules.115 Generally speaking, the proxy rules operate to
provide shareholders, particularly small shareholders, with leverage
against management and the larger shareholder groups within corpo-
rations. The leverage that shareholders receive from the proxy rules
includes required dissemination of certain information and a chance
to issue proposals for voting on certain corporate matters. For exam-
ple, for proxy statements that relate to an annual shareholders' meet-
ing, the regulations require that an annual report accompany or
precede the proxy statement." 6 Although the regulations require
that the annual report contain a MD&A section, 117 courts have typi-
cally not allowed liability for omissions in the required annual report
due to limiting language found in Rule 14a-3.1 8
In certain proxy solicitations however, Item 303 disclosures are
mandated not by Rule 14a-3(b), but by operation of Schedule 14A.1 9
113 Id. at 1100; see also A.J. White & Co. v. SEC, 556 F.2d 619, 622 (1st Cir. 1977)
(holding that a misleading prospectus violates section 5 if material).
114 See SEC v. S.W. Coal & Energy Co., 624 F.2d 1312, 1318-19 (5th Cir. 1980).
115 In re SofamorDanek Group, 123 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 1997), is the only proxy case
found that touches on the treatment of Item 303 disclosure. One of the reasons for
the sparse case law is the general lack of success that proxy fights have encountered
against large corporations. See Cox Er AL.., supra note 1, at 827-28.
116 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b) (2000).
117 Id. § 240.14a-3(b)(5)(ii).
118 See Markewich v. Adikes, 422 F. Supp. 1144, 1147 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Dillon v.
Berg, 326 F. Supp. 1214, 1230 (D. Del. 1971), affd per curiam, 453 F.2d 876 (3d Cir.
1971). The limiting language is found in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(c) (2000) and states
that the annual report is not deemed "subject to this regulation othewise than as
provided in this Rule." Id.
119 The disclosures required by Schedule 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (2000),
must be included by virtue of Rule 14a-3, id. § 240.14a-3(a). Schedule 14A requires
mandatory Item 303 disclosures specifically in proxy statements dealing with authori-
zations or issuance of shares "otherwise than for exchange" of shares of the company,
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Thus, the limiting language in Rule 14a-3 would not apply, and any
omissions related to Item 303 could result in liability from an implied
private right of action under Rule 14a-9.120 Some circuits have found
that omissions of Rule 14a-9 disclosures are subject to a negligence
standard "more closely analogized to section 11 of the Securities Act"
and allow a plaintiff to proceed without establishing scienter.121
Therefore, at least in these circuits, a plaintiff bringing an action for
an Item 303 omission in a proxy statement would have to prove the
following elements: (1) the proxy statement contains a false or mis-
leading statement with respect to a material fact or an omission of a
material fact necessary to make statements therein not misleading, (2)
the defendants were negligent in drafting the statement, and (3) the
proxy caused an injury to plaintiffs. 122
Depending upon the court, the question of whether Item 303 vio-
lations are per se material has a twofold level of importance in Rule
14a-9 cases. First, the importance is magnified in these cases, because
in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., the Supreme Court held that a share-
holder who demonstrates that an omission in a proxy statement is ma-
terial is entitled to a presumption of reliance.'23 A presumption of
reliance can go a long way towards proving causation. 12 4 Second, the
upshot of this presumption is that a plaintiff who finds an omission of
a mandatory Item 303 disclosure, and happens to be in a court that
id. § 240.14a-101 it. 11, and modification or exchange of shares for shares of the com-
pany, id. it. 12. See id. it. 13(a)(3).
120 Id § 240.14a-9(a). Rule 14a-9 prohibits solicitations by means of a proxy state-
ment which is "false or misleading with respect to any material fact," or "omits to state
any material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or mis-
leading." Id.
121 Gould v. Am.-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 777 (3d Cir. 1976); see also Shi-
dler v. All Am. Life & Fim. Corp., 775 F.2d 917, 927 (8th Cir. 1985) (stating that "the
analogy to section 11 is not without merit, but it is inexact").
122 See, ag., In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 78 F. Supp. 2d 976, 988-89 (E.D.
Mo. 1999); Parsons v. Jefferson-Pilot Corp., 789 F. Supp. 697, 701 (M.D.N.C. 1992).
As in Rule 10b-5 causes of action, a plaintiff could assert that an omission in Item 303
caused the accompanying financial statements to be misleading. See supra note 93.
123 396 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1970).
124 SeeAffiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 154 (1972) (stating in
a Rule 10b-5 omission cause of action that an "obligation to disclose" material infor-
mation in conjunction with a failure to disclose "establishes the requisite element of
causation in fact"); Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1173-74 (7th Cir. 1986) (stat-
ing that "'reliance' means only materiality and causation in conjunction" and that
"Angelos... essentially removes reliance as an element independent of causation and
materiality" (quoting Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund v. Angelos, 762 F.2d
522,528 (7th Cir. 1985))); see also Cox ET At., supra note 1, at 746 ("Reliance is simply
the means by which causation is typically established.").
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presumes materiality of such omissions, 25 would have knocked down
almost all of the elements of an implied private cause of action with
the one allegation. To a securities defense attorney, this is akin to
being sent up to the plate to face Pedro Martinez when there is al-
ready an 0-2 count.
E. Treatment of Item 303 Violations in Private Causes of Action
Despite the current undefined principles regarding how courts
should treat Item 303 violations in private securities causes of action,
one optimistic point deserves mention: the current confused princi-
ples are better than the complete lack of principles that existed six to
seven years ago. At that time, Item 303 was just beginning to emerge
as an important component of securities case law due largely to the
effects of the SEC's pursuit of Caterpillar for violating Item 303.128
The few cases that did show up on the dockets were predominately
within the Ninth Circuit, a trend that continues currently. After a pe-
riod of rejecting Item 303 claims on the basis of either requiring an
independent duty to disclose under Rule 10b-5,127 or on questionable
distinctions between mandatory Item 303 disclosures and optional dis-
closures of forward-looking information, 128 courts in the Ninth Circuit
finally began to recognize that allegations of Item 303 violations at
least "lend additional support" to Rule 10b-5 claims. 129
Other circuits underwent a similar development in their Item 303
jurisprudence. Similar to the court in Alfus v. Pyramid Technology
Corp.,130 other courts dispensed with plaintiffs' claims of Item 303 vio-
lations by determining that Item 303 does not provide an indepen-
dent cause of action.13' This approach, however, could simply not be
sustained. Even if Item 303 does not give rise to a private cause of
125 See, e.g., Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1998).
126 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Theoiy and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 BRooIL
L. REV. 763, 803-04 (1995) (stating that the SEC action against Caterpillar reflected
the perceived need for a "test case").
127 See Alfus v. Pyramid Tech. Corp., 764 F. Supp. 598, 608 (N.D. Cal. 1991),
128 See In reVerifone Sec. Litig., 11 F.3d 865, 870 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Convergent
Tech. Sec. Litig., 948 F.2d 507, 516 (9th Cir. 1991).
129 See In reJenny Craig Sec. Litig., [1992-1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 97,337, at 95,723 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 1992).
130 764 F. Supp. 598 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
131 See, e.g., In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1419 n.7 (3d
Cir. 1997) ("It is an open issue whether violations of Item 303 create an independent
cause of action for private plaintiffs."); In re Canandaigua Sec. Litig., 944 F. Supp.
1202, 1209 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("It is far from certain that [ ] a duty to disclose under
Rule 10b-5 may be satisfied by importing the disclosure duties from S-K 303.") .
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action, mandatory Item 303 disclosures still implicate an affirmative
duty to disclose under the securities lavs.
13 2
1. Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corp.: Item 303 Implicates a Duty to
Disclose
Perhaps recognizing the fallacy in decisions that rendered Item
303 violations inert on the basis that they did not give rise to private
causes of action, courts did not take long to develop a different view of
the role of Item 303. Taking a more appropriate, yet still cautious,
view of Item 303's disclosure requirements in the context of securities
liability, these courts have generally held that allegations of Item 303
violations, if material, could impose liability in Rule 10b-5 actions and
actions under sections 11 and 12(a) (2) of the Securities Act.
133
The Shaw case is particularly illuminating because it involved
complaints alleging violations of sections 11 and 12(a) (2) of the Se-
curities Act as well as violations of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 under
the Exchange Act. The case involved the public offering of Digital
Equipment Corporation (DEC) preferred stock pursuant to a shelf
registration on Form S-3134 of nearly $400 million.13 5 DEC apparently
needed the funding badly after a period of large losses and a slower
132 See Gulati, supra note 80, at 725-26.
133 See, eg., Simon v. Am. Power Conversion Corp., 945 F. Supp. 416, 431 & n.20
(D.R.I. 1996) (stating that with "an affirmative duty to disclose material informa-
tion... nondisclosure is actionable under the securities laws"); Wallace v. S)s. &
Computer Tech. Corp., [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH)
99,212, at 95,079-80 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 1996) (recognizing that failure to disclose
deliberate cost increases may have violated Item 303 and the information was "not so
obviously unimportant so as to allow the court to deem them immaterial as a matter
of law").
134 A shelf registration permits a company to file a single registration statement on
Form S-3 covering a specified quantity of securities. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 230A15
(2000) (providing the rules for "delayed or continuous offering and sale of securi-
ties"). Form S-3 allois for a streamlined registration process whereby the registrant
accomplishes much of the disclosure through incorporation by reference of its most
recent Form 10-K and Forms 10-Q. See iL.; Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194,
1205 (1st Cir. 1996). The company can then issue the securities in installments for a
period of up to two years. See 17 C.FR. § 230A15(a) (2) (2000). Typically, the re-
quirements for qualifying for shelf registration are such that it is available to large
companies that are already subject to continuous reporting provisions. &eWielgos v.
Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that Form S-3
"is reserved for firms with a substantial following among anal)sts and professional
investors"); see also 17 C.F.R. § 239.13(a)-(b) (2000) (requiring the aggregate market
value of registrants using Form S-3 to be $75 million or greater).
135 Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1200.
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than expected recovery during the 1992 and 1993 fiscal years.'3 6 DEC
filed the registration statement on January 21, 1994 (January is the
first month of DEC's third quarter) and sold stock through its under-
writers pursuant to the registration statement, a prospectus dated
March 11, 1994, and a prospectus supplement dated March 21,
1994.137 Less than three weeks later, DEC announced a far greater
loss than anticipated for the quarter ended April 2, 1994.138 This
same announcement disclosed that DEC was considering "further re-
structuring," despite a statement in the prospectus supplement that
the existing restructuring reserve of $443 million was adequate to
cover planned restructuring costs. 139 Following the end of the 1994
fiscal year, DEC announced in July of 1994 that it would take an addi-
tional $1.2 billion charge to cover the costs of additional
restructuring.1
40
Two classes of plaintiffs brought actions against DEC: (1) pur-
chasers of shares in the public offering in March brought actions
under sections 11 and 12(2)141 of the Securities Act ("Wilensky plain-
tiffs"); and (2) secondary purchasers of DEC stock brought claims
under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 ("Shaw
plaintiffs"). 142 The heart of both complaints alleged that (1) DEC
management had knowledge of the facts concerning the large losses
during the third quarter; and (2) the representation concerning the
adequacy of the reserve was misleading. 43 The district court dis-
missed both actions.'"
Regarding the Wilensky plaintiffs, the Third Circuit first deter-
mined whether DEC was under a duty to disclose the matters in the
registration statement and prospectuses. 45 Among other reasons, the
court found a duty to disclose could be implicated by the "known
trends and uncertainties" of which Item 303 requires disclosure.' 46






141 In the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Congress changed sec-
tion 12(2) to read "section 12(a) (2)," but did not change the text of the statute in any
significant way. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-
67, § 105(3), 109 Stat. 737, 757 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 771(a) (2) (Supp. IV 1998)).
142 Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1201.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 See id. at 1202-03.
146 See id. at 1205.
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quired by Item 303, Item 12 of the form incorporates by reference the
latest annual report on Form 10-K, which does require Item 303 dis-
closure.147 Furthermore, Item 11 of Form S-3 requires the company
to describe "any and all material changes" which have occurred since
the latest annual report.14 By virtue of this chain of requirements
then, DEC could be liable under sections 11 and 12(a) (2) of the Se-
curities Act for omissions and misstatements relating to material
changes in its Item 303 disclosures.
149
Despite DEC's challenge that any statement regarding predic-
tions of the end of the quarter losses were non-mandatory forard-
looking statements, the Third Circuit found that the close proximity
of the prospectus to the end of the quarter (eleven days) prevented
the court, at such an early stage in the litigation, from determining
that there was no mandatory disclosure requirement. 150 As such, the
court determined that the Wilensky plaintiffs had stated a cognizable
claim that DEC had omitted from the registration statement informa-
tion that, in the language of section 11, was required to be stated
therein.15' The court also found that the statements regarding the
restructuring reserves may have been misleading if DEC management
knew of the large-scale restructuring and that the statements were not
protected by the "bespeaks caution" doctrine.
I52
The court then addressed the section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
claims of the Shaw plaintiffs. Stating that the "same standard of mate-
riality applies to claims under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 as to
claims under sections 11 and 12(2),"1-5 the court found that the same
omissions and misstatements that were actionable for the Nv'lensky
plaintiffs were sufficient for the section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
claims.' 54 Although the Shaw court swaddled its decision regarding
the sections 11 and 12(2) claims in discourse that highlighted the no-
tion that "[t]he obligations that attend the preparation of [public of-
fering] filings embody nothing if not an affirmative duty to disclose a
147 See SEcuRrrEs AND EXCHANGE CONM'N, FoRM S-3, REcsrAx-noN STATFMENT
UNDER THE SEcuRrrEs ACT OF 1933, pt. I, it. 12(a) (1), in 2 Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 1
7153, at 6251 (1999).
148 See id. it. 11(a), in 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 7153, at 6251; s also Shew, 82
F.3d at 1205.
149 See Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1205.
150 Id at 1211. See also Gulati, supra note 80, at 739-42, wvhere the Shaw case is
discussed in the context of Gulati's theories regarding the timing of disclosure for
"ripe" and "unripe" intraquarterly information.
151 Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1211.
152 Id. at 1214.
153 Id. at 1217.
154 Id. at 1222.
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broad range of material information,"' 5 5 the court noted that tie
same omissions are actionable under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 if
the scienter and reliance elements are established. 15 6 Recognizing
the divergence from decisions in other courts,1 57 the Shaw court
stated that it was not creating a private right of action under section
10(b) for violation of any SEC rule, but that its holding is limited to
the "proposition that... plaintiffs who... rely upon the completeness
of a registration statement or prospectus may sue under Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 for nondisclosures of material facts omitted from
those documents in violation of the applicable SEC rules and
regulations."' -5
Although some.courts still seem to cling to the idea that an Item
303 violation needs the impetus of an implied private right of action
to result in liability for a violator, 5 9 most courts have begun to follow
the logic of Shaw.160 This is a positive trend because the Shaw court
recognized where Item 303 should reside within the securities liability
framework-as merely potentially initiating a duty to disclose. Despite
the logic of its decision, an interesting point about the Shaw decision
is that the court never went through the SEC's two-pronged analysis
found in the 1989 Release. Despite this, the court managed to reach
the same conclusion that such an analysis might have produced. 161
However, it does seem that deference should be given to the SEC's
interpretations of its own rules and regulations, at least to the extent
that it does not infringe on the courts' jurisdiction.
62
155 Id. at 1202 (citation omitted).
156 Id. at 1221 ("[I]t is hardly a novel proposition that the 1934 Act and the 1933
Act 'prohibit some of the same conduct.'" (quoting Herman & Maclean v. Huddle-
ston, 459 U.S. 375, 383 (1983) (internal citations omitted in original))).
157 See cases cited supra note 131.
158 Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1222 n.37 (citations omitted).
159 See, e.g., In re Quintel Entm't, Inc. Sec. Litig., 72 F. Supp. 2d 283, 293 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (refusing to recognize an Item 303 cause of action "[fln light of the absence of
authority for the position that a failure to comply with... [Item 303) can be the basis
of a § 10(b) action"). The "absence of authority" noted in Quintel seems a bit surpris-
ing as Shaw and Steckman had both already been decided.
160 See, e.g., Simon v. Am. Power Conversion Corp., 945 F. Supp. 416, 431 n.20
(D.R.I. 1996) (finding that a failure to disclose discovery of a product defect was an
actionable omission of a mandatory Item 303 disclosure); see also Milman v. Box Hill
Sys. Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 220, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding that an omission of dis-
closure regarding poor reception of new products violated Item 303 and, if material,
could constitute a violation of the Securities Act). Confoundingly, the Milman deci-
sion was in the same district as the decision in QuinteL
161 See infra notes 225-28 and accompanying text.
162 See infra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
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2. Item 303 Implicates a Duty to Disclose and Then Some: The
Steckman Decision
Just when a number of courts had seemingly found a nice, safe
place for Item 303 to reside within securities cases, one court took the
allegation of an Item 303 violation to the extreme. In a panel deci-
sion, the Ninth Circuit in Steckman held that allegations of Item 303
violations, without more, were sufficient to support a claim under sec-
tions 11(a) and 12(a) (2) of the Securities Act.' 63 The defendants in
Steckman were Pyramid Breweries, Inc. (formerly Hart Brewing, Inc.),
its officers, and the underwriters of the offering.'" After strong
growth over a four-year period, Pyramid conducted an initial public
offering in December of 1995.165 The initial offering price was $19
per share, but by June of 1996 the stock price had dropped to $12.15
per share.166 The thrust of the plaintiffs' complaint was that Pyramid
had failed to disclose in the MD&A section of the prospectus and re-
gistration statement flat fourth quarter earnings of which it must have
had knowledge by the time of the offering in December.167
The defendant underwriters, relying apparently on the Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision in In re Verifone Securities Litigation,16s claimed that a
complaint alleging violation of Item 303 was not "sufficient to state a
cause of action under the Securities Act."169 Stating that the under-
writers' defense posed "threshold issues," the Stecman court discussed
whether allegations of Item 303 violations also sufficiently state a
claim under sections 11 and 12(a) (2) of the Securities Act.170
According to the Steckman court, the decisions in Veifone and
other similar cases did not apply because they were brought under
163 See Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1998).
164 Id. at 1294.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 1294-95.
167 Id. at 1295. The plaintiffs claimed that Pyramid must have known of the flat
fourth quarter earnings because in the middle of the first quarter of 1996 it was able
to announce that those earnings would deviate from analysts' expectations. Id.
168 11 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 1993).
169 Steckman, 143 F.3d at 1296. The underwriters' reliance on Tiefone seems a bit
strange. The Verifone court really did not speak as to the meaning of an Item 303
violation within a securities cause of action; what the court did find uas that the de-
fendant did not violate Item 303 because the information the plaintiffs claimed
should have been disclosed was forward-looking and thus not required under Item
303. See Veifone 11 F.3d at 870. The Venifone court did hold however, thatviolation of
stock exchange reporting requirements could not be imported as a %iolation of sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Id.
170 Steckman, 143 F.3d at 1296.
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section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, which are implied causes of action.171
Because section 11(a) liability occurs where "a registrant 'omit[s] to
state a material fact required to be stated' in the registration state-
ment.., any omission of facts 'required to be stated' under Item 303"
produces section 11 liability.172 Similarly, a prospectus containing
omissions or misstatements related to Item 303 results in section
12(a) (2) liability.1
73
The Steckman court indicated that its decision rested on the fact
that sections 11 and 12(a) (2) provide express causes of action, while
Rule 10b-5 cases have "only an implied right of action."' 74 What the
court did not indicate is why that should matter; certainly none of the
courts rejecting Item 303 as a basis for Rule 10b-5 liability mentioned
the implied nature of the cause of action as being a factor.'75 Per-
haps, the court was simply referring to the "affirmative duty of disclo-
sure" that exists in the context of the Securities Act and public
offerings as opposed to the periodic reporting requirements under
the Exchange Act;176 but whatever weight this argument might carry
the Steckman court did not rely on it. Despite its reference to the dif-
ference between implied and express causes of action, the real basis
for the Steckman court's holding seemed to be its conclusion that Item
303 violations are "presumably material."1
77
Tracing where the Steckman court got its "presumably material"
language reveals a holding with no real basis in law. The Steckman
court based its conclusion on language in a Third Circuit case, In re
Crafimatic Securities Litigation, stating that "disclosures mandated by law
are presumably material."178 In turn, the Crafimatic court borrowed its
"presumably material" language from a law review article written by
171 Id.
172 Id. (quoting language from section I1(a) of the Securities Act).
173 See id.
174 Id.
175 See, e.g., In reSofamor Danek Group, Inc., 123 F.3d 394, 402 (6th Cir. 1997); In
re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1418 n.7 (3d Cir. 1997); Shaw v.
Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1222 & n.37 (3d Cir. 1996); In re Verifone Sec.
Litig., 11 F.3d 865, 869 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Canandaigua Sec. Litig., 944 F. Supp.
1202, 1209 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
176 Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1202; see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195
(1976) (stating that the Securities Act "was designed to provide investors with full
disclosure of material information concerning public offerings").
177 See Steckman, 143 F.3d at 1296 (quoting In re Craftmatic Sec. Litig., 890 F.2d
628, 641 n.17 (3d Cir. 1990) (amended decision)).
178 890 F.2d 628, 641 n.17 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Victor Brudney, A Note on Mate.
riality and Soft Information Under the Federal Securities Laws, 75 VA. L. REv. 723, 727
(1989)), quoted in Steckman, 143 F.3d at 1296.
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Professor Victor Brudney stating the proposition that "[t ]he particular
items of information mandated... under the 1933 Act or under sec-
tions 12, 13, and 14 of the 1934 Act are presumably automatically
deemed to be 'material.'"179 The article does not provide any source
for this proposition; thus indicating that the Stedman court's decision
rested on a rather fragile foundation.
There are at least three problems with the "presumably material"
language: (1) it ignores the separation of materiality from a duty to
disclose; (2) if carried to its furthest extreme, it could shift the burden
of proof for the materiality element away from the plaintiff for seem-
ingly minor omissions, such as the company's address; 80 and (3) such
presumptions replace the Supreme Court's standard of materiality
with SEC interpretations. This Note has already addressed the issues
surrounding the first problem.181 Regarding the second problem,
one might state that, of course, no court would reasonably presume a
material omission for something as unimportant to an investor as the
company's address. But therein lies the problem-where does a court
draw the line on which one side lie those requirements that a court
can "reasonably" presume material, and on the other those that are
reasonably unimportant to an investor? The presumption must apply
to either all required disclosures mandated by the SEC, or none. Any
other conclusion would result in ad hoc decisions regarding the rela-
tive importance, or perhaps unimportance, of particular line items.
The third problem is much deeper and lies somewhat beyond the
scope of this Note. In brief, intertwining a presumption of materiality
with SEC-required disclosures completely undercuts the Supreme
Court's decisions regarding materiality.182 Although the Steckman
court reasoned that it must give "substantial deference to the SEC's
interpretation of the securities laws,"' 83 the SEC has never pro-
nounced that mandatory Item 303 disclosures are always material.
Even if the SEC had made such a pronouncement, whether the Su-
preme Court would allow the SEC to overrule its own decisions re-
garding materiality seems a questionable conjecture. The Supreme
179 Victor Brudney, A Note on Materiality and Soft Infomation Under the Federal Securi-
ties Laws, 75 VA. L. REv. 723, 727 (1989).
180 See, e.g., SECURImES EXCHANG COMM'N, FoiuM 10-K, ANNUAL REFORT PuR.
SUANT TO SFcnoN 13 OR 15(d) OF TIE SECURTIES E.XCHANCE Acr OF 1934, at 1, in 5
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 31,102, at 22,065 (1999). Page 1 of the form contains the
line used to fill in the registrant's address of its principal executive offices. See id.
181 See supra Part II.
182 See, eg., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988); TSC Indus., Inc.
v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); supra Part Hl.A.
183 Sterkman, 143 F.3d at 1297.
20011
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Court has stated that its deference to SEC interpretations "is con-
strained by our obligation to honor the clear meaning of a statute, as
revealed by its language, purpose, and history."'
84
The problems with the Steckman holding regarding the presumed
materiality of Item 303 violations are troubling particularly in light of
the fact that the holding was unnecessary. In going through the two
prongs of the SEC's 1989 Release,18 5 the court determined that Pyra-
mid's slowdown in sales and increased costs after a period of growth
might very well have been a "mown trend" within the meaning of the
1989 Release. 186 Furthermore, Pyramid could have reasonably ex-
pected the slowdown in the middle of the fourth quarter that oc-
curred just before the IPO. 18 7 The court therefore found that the first
prong did not allow the defendant to escape disclosure and pro-
ceeded to the second prong.'88 However, the court found that the
second prong did not require disclosure. 189 Pyramid, although not
experiencing predicted results, was still experiencing eighty-eight per-
cent growth over sales in the fourth quarter of the prior year. 90 Even
more important, Pyramid had consistently experienced earnings slow-
downs in the fourth quarters of each of the prior two years.191 Based
upon this, the court found that Pyramid could not have reasonably
expected that the slowdown in the fourth quarter of 1995 would have
given management any reasonable expectation of a material effect on
earnings, and the second prong therefore did not require
disclosure. 192
As heartening as it may be to the Item 303 purist (assuming there
is such a creature) to see a court analyze a company's MD&A disclo-
sure in terms of the 1989 Release's two-pronged test, the Stedman
184 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566 n.20 (1979). In SEC v.
Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978), the Court stated that "'the courts are the final authorities
on issues of statutory construction, and 'are not obliged to stand aside and rubber
stamp their affirmance of administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a
statutory mandate or that frustrate the congressional policy underlying a statute.""
Id. at 118 (quoting Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 390 U.S.
261, 272 (1968) (quoting NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291 (1965) (internal citations
omitted))).
185 See 1989 Release, supra note 42, 54 Fed. Reg. at 22,430. For the full text of the
two-pronged analysis, see supra note 62.
186 Steckman, 143 F.3d at 1297.
187 Id.
188 Id.
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court's holding on the presumed materiality of Item 303 disclosures
does not place the regulation in its proper role. Furthermore, be-
cause the court grounded its decision on an application of the facts to
the 1989 Release's two-prong analysis, the effect of its important hold-
ing regarding the presumed materiality of Item 303 violations may not
have been completely apparent.193 Thus, Item 303's role in the con-
text of securities liability still remains undefined and provides report-
ing companies with no meaningful guidelines.
IV. APPLYING DIVERGING STANDARDS OF CoNDucr AND STANDARDS
OF REVIEW TO ITFM 303 CASES
What seems clear from the holdings in various private securities
causes of action is that Item 303's special role within the SEC's report-
ing requirements and its unique "materiality" standard have contrib-
uted to uncertainty as to whether liability should attach from an Item
303 violation. 194 Whereas the Steckrnan court viewed all Item 303 viola-
tions as "presumably material,"195 other courts-like the Shaw court-
have at least questioned whether Item 303 violations are sufficient for
liability in a private cause of action. 196 The varied holdings in these
cases reflect the crux of the problem with establishing any bright-line
rule regarding Item 303 violations: mandatory Item 303 disclosures
encompass a broad spectrum of both material and immaterial infor-
mation.197 The unfairness of the Steckman court's holding becomes
evident when applied to a reporting company that complies fully with
all Item 303 disclosures that are material (in the Basic sense), yet
could still be liable for seemingly minor omissions.
Courts should recognize the range of information with which
management of reporting companies must contend and at least con-
sider whether alleged omissions or misstatements come anywhere
near reaching a level of materiality necessary for liability to attach.
193 But see Renee Deger, Taking Sto&L: Appeals Court Rules Seret Trends Legal, THE
RECoRDER, May 21, 1998, at 4. The article quotes a plaintiff's attorney as stating that
the Steckman court's holding regarding Item 303 violations was "the fact before the
court stated it." I.
194 See e.g., Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 281 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that the
difference between "materiality standards for Rule 10b-5 and SK-303 differ signifi-
cantly," and therefore that an Item 303 violation does not "automatically give rise to a
material omission under Rule 10b-5").
195 Steckman, 143 F.3d at 1296. The court did, however, limit its holding to sec-
tions 11 and 12 claims under the Securities Act.
196 See Oran, 226 F.3d at 287; Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1222 &
n.37 (1st Cir. 1996).
197 See generally discussion supra Part U.B.2.
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Indeed, other areas of law recognize that non-compliance with certain
standards does not automatically result in liability. In his article, The
Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate
Law, Professor Eisenberg describes various legal regimes where courts
recognize that non-compliance with a particular "standard of con-
duct" does not always cause liability to attach under a court's particu-
lar "standard of review."' 98 This Part attempts to reconcile Professor
Eisenberg's concepts with purported Item 303 violations and, using
specific cases, will show that the concepts provide a solid foundation
for courts to review such violations.
A. Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review
Eisenberg defines a "standard of conduct" as stating "how an ac-
tor should conduct a given activity or play a given role."' 99 A "stan-
dard of review" describes "the test a court should apply when it reviews
an actor's conduct to determine whether to impose liability."200 In
their simplest forms, the two standards are conflated-a good exam-
ple being "the standard of conduct that governs automobile drivers is
that they should drive carefully, and the standard of review in a liabil-
ity claim" is whether the driver drove carefully. 20'
In corporate law however, the two standards typically diverge.
For example, corporate directors and officers are typically subject to a
standard of conduct known generally as the "duty of care." 202 Essen-
tially a negligence standard, the duty of care typically requires direc-
tors to "reasonably monitor or oversee the conduct of the
corporation's business,"203 follow up reasonably on information,
20 4
and "employ a reasonable decision-making process to make deci-
sions."205 According to section 4.01 (a) of the American Law Insti-
tute's (ALI) Principles of Corporate Governance, these duties must be
performed "in good faith, in a manner that [the director or officer]
reasonably believes to be in the best interest of the corporation, and
with the care that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be
expected to exercise.
'20 6
198 See generally Eisenberg, supra note 29.
199 Id. at 437.
200 Id.
201 Id. (footnotes omitted).
202 Id. at 438.
203 Id. Eisenberg calls this the "duty to monitor." Id.
204 Id. Eisenberg calls this the "duty of inquiry." Id.
205 Id.
206 AM. LAw INST., PiLciPLEs OF COPOATE GOvRNANCE: ANALYSiS AND R com.
MENDATIONS § 4.01(a) (1994) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES].
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Despite the mention of the "prudent" person and "reasonable be-
lief," courts often subject actual decisions of corporate directors and
officers to a much less stringent standard-known as the business
judgment rule-that only contemplates the reasonableness of the de-
cision.207 To receive the good grace of the businessjudgment rule, at
least under ALl standards, the director or officer need only: (1) make
ajudgment in good faith; (2) not have a personal interest in the sub-
ject of thejudgment; (3) be informed to the extent that the director
or officer reasonably believes necessary, and (4) rationally believe the
judgment is in the best interests of the corporation.208 A director who
meets the business judgment rule requirements is deemed to have ful-
filled the duty under section 4.01 (a).209 A strict reading of the busi-
ness judgment rule requirements reveals that any objective test of
reasonableness or prudence does not apply, except possibly within the
context of "good faith" or "rational belief." With these minimal re-
quirements, rational minds would have to agree that the business
judgment rule tends to reduce liability for corporate directors' and
officers' bad decisions.
210
According to Eisenberg, the divergence of the standard of con-
duct implicated by the duty of care from the standard of review em-
bodied within the business judgment rule is due largely to good
policy.2 1 1 The divergence protects directors and officers from the
threat of unfair liability by providing protection against attacks on
their decisions. The divergence of the two standards also recognizes
the inherent uniqueness of every business decision that prevents di-
rectors from simply claiming, as would a doctor or lawyer, that they
followed a particular industry or practice standard.212 Furthermore,
the divergence can be seen as the law's way of telling directors to act
with due care, but in order to be fair, the law has courts make direc-
tors liable only if the judgment was self-interested, in bad faith, or,
alternatively, if the decision-maker did not appropriately inform him-
self or herself.21
3
To clarify, this Note does not propose that corporate defendants
should have available a business judgment rule as a shield from liabil-
207 Eisenberg, supra note 29, at 441.
208 PRcIPLES, supra note 206, § 4.01(c).
209 Id.
210 See Eisenberg, supra note 29, at 442-43. The business judgment rule does not,
however, save every decision made by a director or officer. Se,, e.g., Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
211 Eisenberg, supra note 29, at 444, 465.
212 See id. at 444 & n.31.
213 See id at 465.
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ity in federal securities causes of action. Indeed, the Supreme Court
rejected at least one form of such a defense in Basic, Inc. v. Levin-
son,214 while at least one other court completely rejected a business
judgment defense in a section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 cause of ac-
tion. 215 What this Note does seek to do, though, is apply Eisenberg's
policy concerns to corporate management faced with the task of hav-
ing to comply with Item 303's less than apparent disclosure standards.
As discussed supra, Item 303's disclosure standard varies greatly
with the facts available to management 21 6 and, to a certain extent, re-
quires management to make predictions regarding the effects of cur-
rently known trends that may not be materiIl.217 These factors
combine to put management in a position where, although it may
have diligently prepared the MD&A section, it could be held liable for
an omission of a trend or uncertainty that it either considered unim-
portant at the time, or which had ultimate results that management
could not accurately forecast with the information at hand. Thus, sim-
ilar concerns that Eisenberg focused upon also apply to Item 303 dis-
closure; courts should therefore recognize the precarious position
that the managements of reporting companies face. The remaining
question concerns how a court can go about recognizing manage-
ment's position using the diverging standards.
B. The Standard of Conduct for Item 303 Disclosure
Stated simply, the standard of conduct for Item 303 disclosure is
this: a company must make all mandatory Item 303 disclosures in its
filings with the SEC. Gauging whether a company has complied with
this standard of conduct begins with a look at the reporting require-
ments dictated by Congress and the SEC. Congress provided the SEC
214 485 U.S. 224, 234 (1988) (finding that assessment of whether merger discus-
sions are significant to investors is not overridden by the corporation's need for se-
crecy); see also Kitch, supra note 126, at 880 (noting the "absence of any role for
business judgment in the Supreme Court's securities law jurisprudence").
,215 See Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 893 F.2d 1405, 1990 WL 3832, at *13 (1st Cir.)
(refusing "to accept any theory of a business judgment defense to scienter that ex-
tends beyond" the good-faith defense), withdrawn and rev'd en banc on other grounds,
910 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1990). The applicability of the business judgment defense to
causes of action brought under sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act also seems
questionable in consideration of the strict liability nature of those sections. See supra
Part III.B-C.
216 See supra Part II.B.2.
217 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (a) (3) (ii) (2000). This regulation requires man-
agement to "describe any known trends or uncertainties" that "the registrant reasona-
bly expects will have a material favorable or unfavorable impact on results of
operations." Id.
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with primary responsibility fop developing disclosure standards under
the federal securities laws.218 Companies that seek to comply with the
disclosure standards of the federal securities laws therefore follow the
guidance and interpretations provided by the SEC. The SEC provided
such guidance for MD&A disclosure in its 1989 Release. Therefore,
any court determining whether a company failed to make a
mandatory Item 303 disclosure should retroactively apply the two-pro-
nged analysis in the 1989 Release.219
The Steckman court was one of the few courts to use the 1989
Release's two-pronged analysis to determine whether the company
should have disclosed information under Item 303.22 In analyzing
the first prong, the Steckman court found that, based on prior experi-
ence, the company could not deem the earnings trend "not reasona-
bly likely to occur."221 Proceeding to the second prong, however, the
Steckman court found that the company-again, based upon prior
years' earnings trends-could have found that the slowdown was not
reasonably likely to have a material effect.2 22 Therefore, the second
prong allowed management, based upon specific facts of which it had
knowledge, to avoid disclosure of the trend and its possible future ef-
fects. Using the two-pronged analysis, the Stediman court found
that-in the language of this discussion-the defendant had com-
plied with the relevant standard of conduct.
Had the court in Shaw used the two-pronged analysis, it might
very well have reached a different result on at least one of the allega-
tions. The Shaw case involved an allegation that management's state-
ment in MD&A that a $443 million restructuring reserve was
"adequate" was misleading when in July of 1994 management in-
creased the reserve to $1.2 billion.223 The gravamen of the plaintiffs'
complaint was that DEC's statement of an existing $443 million re-
218 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77g(a) (1994) ("[Rjegistration statement shall contain
such other information... as the Commission may by rules or regulations require.");
id. §§ 78m(a) (1), 78o(d) (same).
219 'See Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 1998) (ad-
hering to the formula in the 1989 Release "[s]ince we must give substantial deference
to the SEC's interpretation of the securities laws" (citation omitted)).
220 See id; see also Ferber v. Travelers Corp., 802 F. Supp. 698, 711 (D. Conn. 1992)
(analyzing whether defendant had disclosed "known trends" and "uncertainties" re-
garding real estate investments).
221 Steckman, 143 F.3d at 1297.
222 Id.
223 Shawv. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1201 (1st Cir. 1996). The plaintiffs
also alleged that management knew of facts regarding higher than e.'xpected losses for
the third quarter of the company's 1994 fiscal year (which ended eleven days after the
filing of the prospectus). See id. at 1207.
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structuring reserve as "adequate" was materially misleading.224 The
amount of a restructuring reserve implicates the liquidity and capital
resources disclosure requirements of Item 303, which require the dis-
closure of "known material trends" that are reasonably likely to result
in material changes in those areas.225 The plaintiffs were essentially
claiming, then, that Item 303 required DEC to disclose any increased
restructuring activities of which it knew at the time of the filings.
An accounting reserve-such as DEC's restructuring reserve-is
in effect an amount of money that management sets aside to provide
for future costs related to a particular activity or event. Thus, the
plaintiffs' allegation that DEC did not disclose known restructuring
activities that resulted in a $1.2 billion charge four months later was
essentially a claim that DEC failed to disclose known restructuring ac-
tivities related to a potential reserve that is by definition a prediction
of the costs of future restructuring activities. In the framework of tie
1989 Release's two-pronged analysis, disclosure was mandatory if: (1)
DEC not only knew of increased restructuring activities, but also could
not determine that the increased reserve (again, an increase set up
four months later to provide for future restructuring costs) was not
reasonably likely to occur; and (2) at the time of the filing, in its objec-
tively reasonable assessment, 226 DEC could not determine that the
costs of current restructuring activities would not exceed the existing
reserve to the extent of not being reasonably likely to have a material
effect.
Given that the Shaw court had to accept the plaintiffs' allegations
that DEC management had knowledge of increased restructuring ac-
tivities at the time of the SEC filings, its ability to analyze the first
prong was limited. However, the Shaw court could very well have
found that the four month period between the statement regarding
the $443 million reserve in the SEC filings and the announcement of
the $1.2 billion increase was too long to attribute DEC management
with any objectively reasonable expectations of the increase. In an
unrelated part of the opinion, the Shaw court even mentioned the
possibility of "circumstances, [where] the relationship between the
nonpublic information that plaintiffs claim should have been dis-
closed and the actual results or events that the undisclosed informa-
tion supposedly would have presaged will be so attenuated that the
undisclosed information may be deemed immaterial as a matter of
224 See id. at 1211.
225 See 17 G.F.R. § 229.303(a) (1)-(2) (2000).
226 See 1989 Release, supra note 42, 54 Fed. Reg. at 22,430.
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law." 227 Despite the court's mention of the word "immaterial," an-
other way of stating this in the context of Item 303 disclosure is as
follows-although the trend or uncertainty might have been known to
management, it was not such that management could have deter-
mined, at the time of filing, that it was reasonably likely to have led to
the results for which the plaintiff is suing. With this formulation, no
Item 303 violation occurred and DEC therefore compled -ith the
standard of conduct. This is not to say that the Shaw court was neces-
sarily wrong in its conclusion; this Note asserts merely that had the
Shaw court analyzed DEC's conduct from the standpoint of the SEC's
interpretations-specifically, using the 1989 Release-it might have
reached a different result.
C. The Standard of Review for Item 303 Disclosure
Once a court finds that a reporting company has violated the
standard of conduct related to Item 303 disclosure, it next must deter-
mine whether liability should attach to the violation. Not all Item 303
violations reach a level of materiality necessary for liability;2 8 a court
should therefore recognize the appropriateness of a divergent stan-
dard of review. This standard of review requires a look at whether the
violation in question touches on material facts. Put in the Supreme
Court's wording, a court should review whether the omissions or mis-
statements affect information for which there exists a "substantial like-
lihood" that the information would have "been viewed by the
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of
information."2
29
Important policy considerations provide a basis for applying this
separate standard of review in such instances. Although investors
might wish to have access to all the information regarding a com-
pany,230 some commentators have questioned whether too much in-
formation might actually be a problem.23 1 Hence, Congress gave the
SEC the responsibility to "strik[e] a healthy balance" between burdens
imposed upon companies and the purported insatiable appetite of in-
227 Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1210-11 (citations omitted).
228 See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
229 Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (citing TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
230 See Cox Er AL., supra note 1, at 48 ("For users of information, more is always
better, especially if the cost of acquiring it is borne by another-the issuer.").
231 See, e.g., id. at 48 (stating that disclosure rules "driven solely by the information
demands of users lack natural constraints on the burdens to be imposed upon issu-
ers"); Kitch, supra note 126, at 850-51; Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a
Mandatory Corporate Disdosure System, 9J. CoRP. L 1, 16-17 & n.48 (1983).
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vestors for information. 232 Furthermore, in TSC Indusries, Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., the Supreme Court recognized that "[s] ome informa-
tion is of such dubious significance that insistence on its disclosure
may accomplish more harm than good. '233 This concern led to the
Supreme Court's development of a materiality standard in TSC
Industries.23
An important point is that the court's inquiry should focus on the
materiality of the omission or misstatement, not, as some courts have
done, on the nature of the cause of action being brought.235 Al-
though sections 11 and 12 under the Securities Act contain standards
akin to negligence, 23 6 while Rules lOb-5 and 14a-9 actions contem-
plate fraud,23 7 the real issues are: (1) whether the reporting company
violated Item 303 and (2) whether the violation reached the requisite
materiality level. Whether a material violation of Item 303 occurred
in a fraudulent or merely negligent manner is secondary to the initial
analysis under the standard of conduct determining whether the viola-
tion occurred and the separate standard of review to determine
whether the violation was material. This framework recognizes the
informational role of Item 303 within the reporting requirements de-
veloped by the SEC and provides a more orderly manner for courts to
determine whether and how allegations of Item 303 violations should
cause liability to attach.
CONCLUSION
The role of Item 303 within the federal securities laws is vital,
pervasive, and, unfortunately, entirely unclear. The only thing that
appears certain is that Item 303 can produce a duty to disclose under
232 Cox ET AL., supra note 1, at 48.
233 TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448 (1976).
234 See id. at 449.
235 See, e.g., Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 281 n.9 (3d Cir. 2000) (refusing to
consider an Item 303 violation as sufficient in a Rule 10b-5 cause of action); Steckman
v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1998) (differentiating implied
causes of action under Rule 101>5 from express causes of action under sections 11
and 12 for purposes of determining liability for an Item 303 violation).
236 The language of section 11 contemplates conduct that includes a reasonable
investigation-and reasonable belief based upon such investigation-into the truth of
statements in the registration statement and into whether any material omissions ex-
isted. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (3) (A) (1994). Section 12(a) (2) contains a similar stan-
dard of conduct that requires an individual to "sustain the burden of proof that he
did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known," of any
untruth or omission. Id. § 77 1(a) (2) (Supp. IV 1998).
237 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5(b)-(c), 240.14a-9(a) (2000).
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the federal securities laws.238 Although the Steckman court attempted
to provide Item 303 with more potency by deeming it presumably ma-
terial for actions under sections 11 and 12(a) (2) of the Securities
Act, 239 such a presumption appears incorrect.2 40 With the exception
of Steckman, courts have encountered difficulty in determining what
role Item 303 should play in a private cause of action. The difficulty is
easy to understand as Item 303's disclosure standard is fact-specific
and does not always necessarily implicate materiality.
2 41
Despite Item 303's problems, because balance sheets, income
statements, and the other hard information included in SEC filings
are mere historic pictures of a company's success or failure, courts
should provide Item 303 with some bite. Allowing cases to proceed
based on omissions or misstatements of mandatory Item 303 disclo-
sure protects Item 303's vital role of providing investors with useful
insight into management's view of the company. However, the bite
that courts give to Item 303 should be tempered by the acknowledge-
ment that Item 303 disclosures, like other mandatory disclosures
under the federal securities laws, in many instances only reflect the
SEC's determination of "information that on average will be consid-
ered useful, if not important, to investors and shareholders."
2 42
Furthermore, the MD&A disclosures that Item 303 mandates are
necessarily a function of management's judgments and decisions re-
garding the information it has at a particular point in time. Holding
management liable under a negligence or strict liability standard of
review ignores completely the many factors and variations that affect a
business from day to day and their effects on management's judg-
ments. A distinct standard of review that attempts to discern the dif-
ference between material and immaterial failures to acknowledge
known trends and their reasonably expected effects from future re-
sults could operate to dismiss securities cases that should not go be-
yond a motion to dismiss.
238 See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
239 See Steckman, 143 F.3d at 1296.
240 See supra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
241 See supra Part II.B.
242 Cox Er AL., supra note 1, at 51.
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